

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute. [Footnote 1] At trial, the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Page 389 U. S. 349 because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]." [Footnote 2] We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional questions thus presented. [Footnote 3]

The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:

"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth. " Page 389 U. S. 350

"B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."

We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. [Footnote 4] Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. [Footnote 5] But the protection of a person's *general* right to privacy -- his right to be let alone by other people [Footnote 6] -- is, like the Page 389 U. S. 351 protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States. [Footnote 7]

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. [Footnote 8] But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. [Footnote 9] For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. *See Lewis v. United States*, 385 U. S. 206, 385 U. S. 210; *United States v. Lee*, 274 U. S. 559, 274 U. S. 563. But

what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. [Page 389 U. S. 352](#)

See Rios v. United States, [364 U. S. 253](#); *Ex parte Jackson*, [96 U. S. 727](#), [96 U. S. 733](#).

The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye -- it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office, [\[Footnote 10\]](#) in a friend's apartment, [\[Footnote 11\]](#) or in a taxicab, [\[Footnote 12\]](#) a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.

The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, *Olmstead v. United States*, [277 U. S. 438](#), [277 U. S. 457](#), [277 U. S. 464](#), [277 U. S. 466](#); *Goldman v. United States*, [316 U. S. 129](#), [316 U. S. 134-136](#), for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible [Page 389 U. S. 353](#) property. [\[Footnote 13\]](#) But "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." *Warden v. Hayden*, [387 U. S. 294](#), [387 U. S. 304](#). Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in *Olmstead* that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." *Silverman v. United States*, [365 U. S. 505](#), [365 U. S. 511](#). Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.

We conclude that the underpinnings of *Olmstead* and *Goldman* have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. [Page 389 U. S. 354](#)

The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: they did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth, [Footnote 14] and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself. [Footnote 15]

Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts, in fact, took place. Only last Term we sustained the validity of Page 389 U. S. 355 such an authorization, holding that, under sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a federal court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense." *Osborn v. United States*, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 329-330. Discussing that holding, the Court in *Berger v. New York*, 388 U. S. 41, said that "the order authorizing the use of the electronic device" in *Osborn* "afforded similar protections to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence." Through those protections, "no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances." *Id.* at 388 U. S. 57. [Footnote 16] Here, too, a similar Page 389 U. S. 356 judicial order could have accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement" [Footnote 17] by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.

The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in *Olmstead* and *Goldman*, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive Page 389 U. S. 357 means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause," *Agnello v. United States*, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 33, for the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police. . . ." *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U. S. 471, 371 U. S. 481-482. "Over and again, this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the

[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," *United States v. Jeffers*, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S. 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are *per se* unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment [Footnote 18] -- subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. [Footnote 19]

It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest. [Footnote 20] Page 389 U. S. 358

Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit." [Footnote 21] And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent. [Footnote 22]

The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this case. [Footnote 23] It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization "bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment."

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 379 U. S. 96. And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment Page 389 U. S. 359 violations "only in the discretion of the police." *Id.* at 379 U. S. 97.

These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment," [Footnote 24] a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[Footnote 1]

18 U.S.C. § 1084. That statute provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for

the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal."

[Footnote 2]

369 F.2d 130, 134

[Footnote 3]

386 U. S. 954. The petition for certiorari also challenged the validity of a warrant authorizing the search of the petitioner's premises. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that issue.

We find no merit in the petitioner's further suggestion that his indictment must be dismissed. After his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he testified before a federal grand jury concerning the charges involved here. Because he was compelled to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity, 48 Stat. 1096, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 409(l), it is clear that the fruit of his testimony cannot be used against him in any future trial. But the petitioner asks for more. He contends that his conviction must be vacated and the charges against him dismissed lest he be "subjected to [a] penalty . . . on account of [a] . . . matter . . . concerning which he [was] compelled . . . to testify. . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 409(l). *Frank v. United States*, 347 F.2d 486. We disagree. In relevant part, § 409(l) substantially repeats the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U.S.C. § 46, which was Congress' response to this Court's statement that an immunity statute can supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only if it affords adequate protection from future prosecution or conviction. *Counselman v. Hitchcock*, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 585-586. The statutory provision here involved was designed to provide such protection, *see Brown v. United States*, 359 U. S. 41, 359 U. S. 45-46, not to confer immunity from punishment pursuant to a *prior* prosecution and adjudication of guilt. *Cf. Regina v. United States*, 364 U. S. 507, 364 U. S. 513-514.

[Footnote 4]

"The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth. . . . And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home."

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 381 U. S. 509 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK).

[Footnote 5]

The First Amendment, for example, imposes limitations upon governmental abridgment of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." *NAACP v. Alabama*, 357 U. S. 449, 357 U. S. 462. The Third Amendment's prohibition against the unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion. To some extent, the Fifth Amendment too "reflects the Constitution's concern for *the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life."*" *Tehan v. Shott*, 382 U. S. 406, 382 U. S. 416. *Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution.*

[Footnote 6]

See Warren & Brandeis, *The Right to Privacy*, 4 Harv.L.Rev.193 (1890).

[Footnote 7]

See, e.g., *Time, Inc. v. Hill*, 385 U. S. 374. Cf. *Breard v. Alexandria*, 341 U. S. 622; *Kovacs v. Cooper*, 336 U. S. 77.

[Footnote 8]

In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled competing lists of "protected areas" for our consideration. It appears to be common ground that a private home is such an area, *Weeks v. United States*, 232 U. S. 383, but that an open field is not. *Hester v. United States*, 265 U. S. 57. Defending the inclusion of a telephone booth in his list the petitioner cites *United States v. Stone*, 232 F.Supp. 396, and *United States v. Madison*, 32 L.W. 2243 (D.C. Ct.Gen.Sess.). Urging that the telephone booth should be excluded, the Government finds support in *United States v. Borgese*, 235 F.Supp. 286.

[Footnote 9]

It is true that this Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of "constitutionally protected areas," see, e.g., *Silverman v. United States*, 365 U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 510, 365 U. S. 512; *Lopez v. United States*, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 438-439; *Berger v. New York*, 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 57, 388 U. S. 59, but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.

[Footnote 10]

Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385.

[Footnote 11]

Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257.

[Footnote 12]

Rios v United States, 364 U. S. 253.

[Footnote 13]

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 464-466. We do not deal in this case with the law of detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

[Footnote 14]

Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence. They preserved the petitioners end of conversations concerning the placing of bets and the receipt of wagering information.

[Footnote 15]

On the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them.

[Footnote 16]

Although the protections afforded the petitioner in *Osborn* were "*similar . . . to those . . . of conventional warrants*," they were not identical. A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search. But if *Osborn* had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized electronic surveillance in *Osborn* simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence. *See Ker v. California*, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 37-41.

Although some have thought that this "exception to the notice requirement where exigent circumstances are present," *id.* at 374 U. S. 39, should be deemed inapplicable where police enter a home before its occupants are aware that officers are present, *id.* at 374 U. S. 55-58 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN), the reasons for such a limitation have no bearing here. However true it may be that "[i]nnocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion," *id.* at 374 U. S. 57, and that "the requirement of awareness . . . serves to minimize the hazards of the officers' dangerous calling," *id.* at 374 U. S. 57-58, these considerations are not relevant to the problems presented by judicially authorized electronic surveillance.

Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice. Rule 41(d) does require federal officers to serve upon the person searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt describing the material obtained, but it does not invariably require that this be done before the search takes place. *Nordelli v. United States*, 24 F.2d 665, 666-667.

Thus, the fact that the petitioner in *Osborn* was unaware that his words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this Court from sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court in *Berger* from reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording device sanctioned in *Osborn* was entirely lawful. 388 U. S. 41, 388 U. S. 57.

[Footnote 17]

Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 464 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

[Footnote 18]

See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 357 U. S. 497-499; *Rios v. United States*, 364 U. S. 253, 364 U. S. 261; *Chapman v. United States*, 365 U. S. 610, 365 U. S. 613-615; *Stoner v. California*, 376 U. S. 483, 376 U. S. 486-487.

[Footnote 19]

See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 153, 156; *McDonald v. United States*, 335 U. S. 451, 335 U. S. 454-456; *Brinegar v. United States*, 338 U. S. 160, 338 U. S. 174-177; *Cooper v. California*, 386 U. S. 58; *Warden v. Hayden*, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 298-300.

[Footnote 20]

In *Agnello v. United States*, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S. 30, the Court stated:

"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted."

Whatever one's view of "the longstanding practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest," *United States v. Rabinowitz*, 339 U. S. 56, 339 U. S. 61; *cf. id.* at 339 U. S. 71-79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), the concept of an "incidental" search cannot readily be extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.

[Footnote 21]

Although

"[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others,"

Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 298-299, there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.

[Footnote 22]

A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, *Zap v. United States*, 328 U. S. 624, but, of course, "the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect." *Lopez v. United States*, 373 U. S. 427, 373 U. S. 463 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

[Footnote 23]

Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.

[Footnote 24]

See Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 385 U. S. 330.